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          AGAINST HARMONY
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Abstract  Many prominent writers on the philosophy of logic, including Michael 
Dummett, Dag Prawitz, Neil Tennant, have held that the introduction and elimination rules of a logical 
connective must be ‘in harmony’ if the connective is to possess a sense.  This Harmony Thesis has been 
used to justify the choice of logic: in particular, supposed violations of it by the classical rules for 
negation have been the basis for arguments for switching from classical to intuitionistic logic.  The 
Thesis has also had an influence on the philosophy of language: some prominent writers in that area, 
notably Dummett and Robert Brandom, have taken it to be a special case of a more general 
requirement that the grounds for asserting a statement must cohere with its consequences.  This essay 
considers various ways of making the Harmony Thesis precise and scrutinizes the most influential 
arguments for it.  The verdict is negative: all the extant arguments for the Thesis are weak, and no 
version of it is remotely plausible. 
 
 
Keywords  Logical connectives, proof-theoretic harmony, proof-theoretic semantics, 
Inversion Principle, natural deduction, sequent calculi, Michael Dummett, Gerhard Gentzen, Dag 
Prawitz 
 
 
 
                                                 
* This essay derives from a talk delivered to a conference on Logic and Inference held at the University 
of London on 20 March 2015.  I am much indebted to the organizers, Julien Murzi and Florian 
Steinberger, and to those who participated in the discussion: Sinan Dogramaci, Gilbert Harman, Gail 
Leckie, David Makinson, and Joshua Schechter.  I also thank the editors of this volume for helpful 
comments on a draft. 
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In both natural deduction and sequent formalizations of logical systems, each connective is associated 
with an introduction rule and an elimination rule.  The introduction rule for the connective C is one 
which licenses the derivation of a formula dominated by C; the elimination rule is one which licenses 
the deduction of further conclusions from such a formula, often with other formulae as auxiliary 
premisses.  In the sense of the term with which I shall be concerned, harmony is a particular 
relationship between the introduction rule and the elimination rule for a given connective.  Whether the 
rules of a logical system are harmonious is certainly of great interest to proof theorists, but I am 
concerned with a philosophical claim about the notion.  The Harmony Thesis, as I shall call it, says that 
a connective is defective unless its associated introduction and elimination rules are in harmony.  It also 
says that a connective is defective if the logical principles which regulate its use go beyond a pair of 
harmonious introduction and elimination rules.  Most proponents of the Harmony Thesis have, indeed, 
a particular defect in mind.  On their view, a connective will not possess a sense—it will not have a 
coherent meaning—unless its logical behaviour is regulated only by a pair of harmonious introduction 
and elimination rules. 
The Harmony Thesis is connected to wider claims in the philosophy of language and the 
philosophy of logic.  According to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS), the meaning of a complete 
statement is determined by its role in inference, and the meanings of sub-sentential expressions are 
determined by their contribution to the inferential roles of complete statements in which they figure.  
As Julien Murzi and Florian Steinberger remark in their contribution to this volume, many adherents of 
IRS appeal to the Harmony Thesis in order to circumscribe the range of meaning-determining 
inferential roles.  We have yet to see what harmony comes to, but it is also widely held that the 
classical introduction and elimination rules for negation violate the Thesis, so Harmony is often 
invoked in challenges to classical logic.  Dummett’s The Logical Basis of Metaphysics provides a good 
example of this.  He holds that a connective’s introduction and elimination rules must be in harmony if 
the connective is to make sense.  So he takes the perceived lack of harmony between the classical rules 
for negation to be ‘a strong ground for suspicion that the supposed understanding [of classical 
negation] is spurious’ (Dummett 1991, 299). 
In this essay, I want to scrutinize the most influential arguments which have been put forward 
for the Harmony Thesis.  I find these arguments wanting, so my conclusion will be that the Thesis is 
not well supported.  Any rejection of it must be provisional: tomorrow, someone may come up with a 
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brilliant new argument which will persuade us all that there is a requirement of harmony on any 
intelligible connective.  But I doubt it.  As the analysis will reveal, the most popular arguments for the 
Harmony Thesis are not near-misses which might succeed with a bit of tweaking.  Rather, they are 
superficially plausible arguments which turn out, on closer examination, to rely upon very dubious 
premisses from epistemology and the theory of meaning.  My analysis will not challenge the claim that 
deductive systems exhibiting harmony have attractive proof-theoretical features; to the contrary, I 
regard that claim as obviously true.  But a connective may possess a sense, and may in other ways be 
non-defective, without generating those nice features, so the elegance of a harmonious proof theory 
does not settle the philosophical questions I am addressing.  I conclude by discussing briefly how the 
failure of the Harmony Thesis affects the prospects for Inferential Role Semantics. 
 
 
1. The Inversion Principle 
 
I have been using the term ‘harmony’, but what exactly does it mean?  As we shall see, different parties 
mean rather different things by it.  I start by expounding what I take to be the most prominent version 
of the Harmony Thesis. 
Central to this version is the claim that a connective’s introduction rule determines its sense or 
meaning.  The claim goes right back to Gentzen, who wrote that ‘the introduction rules represent, so to 
say, the “definitions” of the signs in question [i.e. the connectives and quantifiers], and the elimination 
rules are, in the final analysis, no more than consequences of these definitions…In eliminating a sign, 
we may use a formula whose main connective that sign is only with the meaning afforded it by the 
sign’s introduction rule’ (Gentzen 1935, 189 = Gentzen 1969, 80).  Prawitz (see especially 1974), 
Dummett (see 1991), and Negri and von Plato (2001) also accept this claim. 
What, exactly, are introduction rules and elimination rules?  As we shall see, some delicate 
issues surround this question, but an initial answer runs as follows.  While they may be extended to 
natural languages, the notions were originally applied to formalized languages, so let us consider for 
simplicity a propositional language L with sentence letters P1, P2,… and a collection of finitary 
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connectives.  A sequent is then defined to be an expression X  A, where A is a formula of L and X is a 
finite set (possibly empty) of such formulae.\
1
/  Where n  0, consider the (n+1)-tuple of sequents 
<X1  A1,…, Xn  An, Y  B>.  This determines an (n+1)-ary rule for sequents (for short, a rule), 
comprising all substitution instances of the (n+1)-tuple.  This rule is understood as licensing the 
passage from any substitution instance of the first n sequents (the premiss sequents) to the 
corresponding instance of the last sequent (the conclusion sequent).  We mark the division between the 
premiss and conclusion sequents with the solidus, /.  When n = 0, we have a rule of inference, such as 
-introduction:  / P1, P2  P1  P2 (when displaying particular rules, I shall often omit the angled 
brackets around tuples).  When n  1, we have a rule of proof, such as -introduction: 
X, P1  P2 / X  P1  P2.  A rule is elementary if all its members are substitution instances of a tuple 
<X1  A1,…, Xn  An /Y  B> such that (a) all the formulae in all the sequents are sentence letters 
except for at most one, which is of the form C(P1,…, Pk) for some k-place connective C; and (b) this 
complex formula C(P1,…, Pk) (if it appears at all) occurs either on the left or the right of the conclusion 
sequent Y  B.  If it occurs on the right of , the elementary rule in question is an introduction rule 
for C.  If it occurs on the left, it is an elimination rule for C.\
2
/ 
On this account, the rule of double negation elimination (DNE)—from A, infer A—does 
not qualify as an elimination rule.  While this consequence may initially seem surprising, it is to be 
welcomed.  Gentzen described DNE as an elimination rule: DNE, he wrote, ‘represents a new 
elimination of negation whose admissibility does not follow at all from our way of introducing the 
negation sign by the -I rule’ (Gentzen 1935, 190 = Gentzen 1969, 81).  Dummett followed him in 
this.  Indeed, Dummett’s critique of classical logic in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics is really an 
extended elaboration of the sentence just quoted from Gentzen: the classical elimination rule for 
negation, viz. DNE, is not in harmony with its introduction rule.  But DNE does not conform to 
Dummett’s own account of what an elimination rule is.  In applying DNE we pass, of course, to a 
                                                 
1
  On my account, then, introduction and elimination rules are rules in a sequent calculus.  Some of the 
writings to be examined below take harmony to be a relation between rules in natural-deduction 
formalizations of logic.  In a rigorous treatment of this topic, however, it is best to work in a sequent 
framework, where the assumptions on which a conclusion depends are explicitly represented.  The 
philosophical arguments for harmony proposed by those who prefer natural-deduction formalizations 
transpose to the sequent framework. 
 
2
  For these definitions, cf. Humberstone and Makinson 2011, §2.  As they remark (op. cit., n.5), a rule 
which is elementary in the present sense will be both ‘pure’ and ‘simple’ in the terminology of 
Dummett 1991. 
 5 
conclusion that contains two fewer occurrences of ‘’ than does the premiss, but that is not enough for 
it to count as an elimination rule.  ‘In the case of a logical constant, we may regard the introduction 
rules governing it as giving the conditions for the assertion of a statement of which it is the main 
operator, and the elimination rules as giving the consequences of such a statement’ (Dummett 1981, 
454-5; emphasis added).  The DNE rule tells us nothing in general about the consequences of 
statements in the form 
A.  It tells us something only about the very special case of statements in the 
form 
 A.  It is to the good, then, that the proposed account does not classify DNE as an elimination 
rule. 
In what sense might an introduction rule for C be thought to define C?  According to Prawitz 
and Dummett, it does so by specifying the direct grounds (alias the ‘canonical’ grounds) for asserting a 
formula dominated by C.  Suppose that G1 is a direct ground for asserting the interpreted formula A and 
that G2 is a direct ground for asserting the interpreted formula B.  Then the rule of -introduction tells 
us that the combination of G1 with G2 constitutes a direct ground for asserting the conjunctive formula 

A  B.  Indeed, if this rule is to define the sense of ‘’, it must be understood as telling us that the only 
direct grounds for asserting 

A  B are those which combine a direct ground for A with a direct ground 
for B.  The introduction rule for ‘’ is <P1/ P1  P2>  <P2/ P1  P2>.  In a similar way, this rule is to 
be read as telling us that a direct ground for asserting a disjunctive formula 

A  B will be either a 
direct ground for A or a direct ground for B.  As remarked, the rule of - introduction is a rule of 
proof, not a rule of inference, so here matters are less straightforward.  But - introduction is 
understood as telling us that a direct ground for asserting 

A  B is a method for transforming any 
ground for A into a ground for B.  There are of course grounds for assertion—indeed, conclusive 
grounds for assertion—which are not direct.  Thus we might assert A  B, not on the basis of the 
combination of G1 with G2, but on the strength of a deduction of 

A  B from the premisses C and 

C  A  B. 
Any development of this theory of direct or canonical grounds clearly faces problems.  For 
one thing, the method that constitutes a direct ground for asserting 

A  B needs to be one that 
transforms any ground for A into a ground for B, so the specification of direct grounds would appear 
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not to be straightforwardly compositional.\
3
/  It is, however, in the context of this conception of the 
meaning of the connectives that the present version of the Harmony Thesis belongs.  For suppose that 
the meaning of a connective C is given by its introduction rule; then the elimination rule for C must be 
faithful to that meaning.  In Gentzen’s words, we may use C only with the meaning that the 
introduction rule affords it.  On this view, the requirement of harmony does no more than spell out 
what such fidelity consists in.  Gentzen conveys the requirement he has in mind only by way of an 
example: ‘if we wished to use [the formula A  B] by eliminating the -symbol…we could do this 
precisely by inferring B directly, once A has been proved, for what A  B attests is just the existence of 
a derivation of B from A’ (Gentzen 1935, 189 = Gentzen 1969, 80-1, with incidental changes in the 
symbolism).  Negri and von Plato, though, spell out the general principle to which Gentzen implicitly 
appeals.  To find the elimination rule which is faithful to a given introduction rule, they write, ‘we ask 
what the conditions are, in addition to assuming the major premiss derived, that are needed to satisfy 
the Inversion Principle: 
 
Whatever follows from the direct grounds for deriving a formula must follow from that 
formula (Negri and von Plato 2001, 6; I write ‘formula’ where they have ‘proposition’). 
 
According to the present version of the Harmony Thesis, then, a non-defective logical connective must 
be regulated only by a pair of introduction and elimination rules which satisfy the Inversion Principle.  
This version of the Thesis is justified by the claim that the elimination rule for a connective must be 
faithful to the introduction rule that defines the connective’s meaning.  One finds similar, albeit less 
explicit, formulations of this version of the Thesis, and of the suggested justification for it, in Prawitz 
and Dummett.\
4
/ 
One merit which Negri and von Plato claim for their formulation is that it not only justifies a 
certain elimination rule, given an introduction rule, but ‘actually determines what the elimination rules 
                                                 
3
  In the first edition of Elements of Intuitionism (1977, 394-5), Dummett argued that the theory could 
be made compositional, all the same.  For scepticism about his proposed way of achieving this, see 
Prawitz 1987, esp. 156-63, and Pagin 2009, esp. 724-34.  Dummett entirely rewrote this passage for the 
second edition of Elements, and there concluded that the form of compositionality that could be 
justified was only ‘a very thin one’ (2000, 274). 
 
4
  On the history of inversion principles, with references to Lorenzen (1950, 1955) and Schroeder-
Heister (1984) as well as to Gentzen and Prawitz, see Moriconi and Tesconi 2008. 
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corresponding to given introduction rules should be’ (2001, xvi).\5/  Take disjunction as an example.  
The direct grounds for 

A  B, we saw, are either direct grounds for A or direct grounds for B.  The 
Inversion Principle is understood to say that whatever follows from any of the direct grounds for 
asserting a formula must follow from that formula.  So we reach the -elimination rule in the form: 
given a derivation of C from the assumption A, and another derivation of it from the assumption B, we 
may derive C from the disjunction 

A  B.  This is, in fact, the form of -elimination that Negri and 
von Plato take their Inversion Principle to yield (2001, 7) and they go on to show how to excise from a 
derivation any deductive steps in which an instance of -introduction is immediately followed by an 
instance of -elimination.  Suppose, for example, that we apply -introduction to derive A  B from 
A, and then immediately eliminate 

A  B to reach the conclusion C.  The derivation will then have the 
form 
 
                                                     A  B 
   A                                                       
A  B                                              C  C 
______________________________________________ 
   C  
 
and we may simplify it by cutting out the occurrence of  

A  B entirely, thereby reaching 
 
  
 A 
  
 C. 
 
This is an example of what Prawitz labels a ‘reduction step’ and of what Dummett calls ‘levelling a 
local peak’. 
                                                 
5
  Thereby gratifying a desideratum of Gentzen’s: ‘By making these ideas more precise it should be 
possible to display the E-inferences [i.e. the elimination rules] as unique functions [eindeutige 
Funktionen] of their corresponding I-inferences [introduction rules], on the basis of certain 
requirements’ (Gentzen 1935, 189 = Gentzen 1969, 81). 
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There is, however, a problem here.  The form of -elimination that Negri and von Plato’s 
Inversion Principle yields is the restricted version of the rule found in quantum logic, in which the 
conclusion C must be derived from A, and from B, without the use of any side premisses.\
6
/  However, 
only a few pages later in their treatise on proof theory (op. cit., 15), they blithely reformulate the 
elimination rule in the form with side premisses: it is this stronger form of the rule that is found in 
classical, intuitionistic, and indeed minimal logic.  It is hard to see what justifies the switch: in 
identifying the elimination rule that matches a given introduction rule, Negri and von Plato tell us, we 
are to ‘ask what the conditions are…that are needed to satisfy the Inversion Principle’ (2001, 6, with 
emphasis added): the ‘needed’ seems to imply that we are to select the weakest elimination rule which 
satisfies Inversion.\
7
/  I shall return to this problem in due course. 
 
 
2. An argument for the Inversion Principle 
 
First, though, we should consider the central question which this attempted justification of the 
Harmony Thesis raises: why should we accept the Inversion Principle? 
At first blush, there seems to be a compelling argument for the Principle.  As we have seen, it 
is to be read as saying: ‘Whatever follows from any of the direct grounds for asserting a formula must 
follow from that formula.’  Let C be a formula which follows from any of the direct grounds for 
asserting a formula A, and suppose that A is asserted.  If A has been correctly asserted, one might think, 
then at least one of its direct grounds must obtain.  Ex hypothesi, C follows from any such ground.  So 
C must obtain if A has been correctly asserted.  C, then, is a commitment of a correct assertion of A, 
and as such—one might think—C must follow from A.  So far from being compelling, however, this 
argument faces two severe problems. 
First, and most obviously, the argument implicitly rejects the view that consequence is a 
matter of the preservation (or necessary preservation) of truth in favour of a view whereby 
                                                 
6
  The same problem attends Stephen Read’s requirement of ‘general-elimination harmony’.  See Read 
2010, 566. 
 
7
  As Negri and von Plato recognize, their Inversion Principle yields more general forms of -
elimination and of -elimination than one usually finds in the textbooks (see 2001, 6-7 and 8-9).  I do 
not object to this aspect of their theory, which might well be a bonus rather than a drawback.  However, 
the inability to justify the unrestricted form of -elimination is a difficulty. 
 
 9 
consequence is a matter of the preservation (or necessary preservation) of correct assertibility.  For 
suppose one did think that consequence was a matter of the preservation of truth.  In that case, the 
proposed justification of Harmony would scarcely get started.  On this view, in order to argue that C 
follows from A, we would need to show that C is true given only the assumption that A is true.  From 
the assumption that A is true, however, it does not follow that any direct ground for asserting A obtains.  
Indeed, it does not follow that any ground for asserting A obtains.  For all that has been said, the 
formula A might be true but unassertible.  Only if consequence is understood to consist in the 
preservation of correct assertibility, then, does the mooted argument so much as get going.  On that 
alternative view of consequence, in seeking to show that C follows from A, we shall start by assuming 
that A is correctly asserted. 
A second problem confronts the argument, though, even if we do take consequence to consist 
in the preservation of correct assertibility rather than in the preservation of truth.  On this view, in 
trying to show that C follows from A we shall start by assuming that A is correctly asserted, from which 
it follows that some ground for asserting A obtains.  What we are given about C, though, is that it 
follows from any direct ground for asserting A.  So in order to conclude from our assumption that C 
obtains, we shall need a premiss to the effect that whenever a ground for asserting a formula obtains, 
some direct ground for asserting it obtains.  It is far from obvious what is supposed to support this 
additional premiss.  Indeed, pending further explanation of what a ‘direct’ ground is, it is far from clear 
what the additional premiss means. 
In view of this unclarity, one might be tempted to delete the word ‘direct’ from the 
formulation of the Inversion Principle altogether, so that it now says simply: ‘Whatever follows from 
any of the grounds for asserting a formula must follow from that formula’.  The resulting position, 
however, does not at all fit the view we are considering, whereby the introduction rule for a connective 
is held to specify that connective’s meaning.  At least, it does not fit this view if the rules in question 
are to be the familiar introduction rules for the connectives.  On this version of the view, the rule of -
introduction would imply that there are grounds for asserting the disjunction 

A  B if and only if there 
are grounds for asserting A or grounds for asserting B.  And the ‘only if’ part of this claim is simply 
false, at least if the symbol ‘’ is supposed to have even roughly the same meaning as the English word 
‘or’.  As Dummett noted in his early paper ‘Truth’ (1959), the claim is wholly unsustainable if we 
allow that the testimony of others can provide grounds for assertions.  Reliable sources from the 
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Egyptian Fourth Dynasty tell us that the Pharaoh Cheops (whom Egyptologists now call ‘Khufu’) was 
either the son or the stepson of his predecessor on the throne, the Pharaoh Sneferu.  Those sources, 
then, provide grounds for that disjunctive assertion.  There are, though, no reliable grounds for 
asserting either disjunct.  Indeed, there are other counterexamples to the ‘only if’ claim which do not 
rely on knowledge by testimony.  If Inspector Morse knows (from the position of wounds on the 
victim) that the murderer is left-handed, and that Smith and Jones are the only left-handers among the 
possible culprits, then he has grounds for asserting ‘Either Smith or Jones is the murderer’.  In that 
circumstance, though, Morse may have no grounds for asserting either ‘Smith is the murderer’ or 
‘Jones is the murderer’.  What we see, then, is that the present argument for the Inversion Principle 
depends upon finding a sense for the word ‘direct’ (or ‘canonical’) which treads a fine line.  The sense 
has to be sufficiently generous to ensure that whenever a ground for asserting a formula obtains, a 
direct ground obtains.  At the same time, it has to be sufficiently restricted to ensure that a direct 
ground for asserting 

A  B involves either a direct ground for A or a direct ground for B.  (The 
introduction rules for the other connectives will impose corresponding restrictions on the acceptable 
sense of ‘direct’.) 
 
 
3. Problems with the argument 
 
What are the prospects of solving these problems so that the present argument for Inversion can be 
vindicated?  I address the problems in turn. 
There is no doubt that the conception of consequence on which the argument rests deviates 
from the conception which has animated logic since its creation.  The key mark of a valid argument is 
that its conclusion is true whenever all its premisses are true.  At the heart of consequence, then, lies 
preservation of truth, not preservation of correct assertibility, or of knowability, or of anything other 
than truth.  While disputes persist about the proper explanation of consequence, those disputes centre 
on what surrounds that heart: notably whether consequence involves the necessary preservation of truth 
(as Aristotle held) or whether actual preservation will do; and whether the sort of truth-preservation 
which is characteristic of logical consequence must be rooted in a formal relationship between 
premisses and conclusion.  If an explanation of consequence in terms of the preservation of correct 
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assertibility is going to be more than an eccentric misuse of the familiar notion, we must take ourselves 
to be in a dialectical context in which truth has already been ‘dethroned’ (as people used to say) from 
its usual place in that explanation.  More particularly, we must presume that powerful arguments have 
already been given for explaining consequence in terms of the preservation of correct assertibility. 
Supposing for a moment that some powerful arguments to this effect have been given, the 
foundations of logic will certainly need reconstruction.  Logicians prove soundness theorems for 
various logical systems.  That is, they show that, if the rules of a given system are followed, then the 
conclusion is true in every possible circumstance in which all the premisses are true.  But what can 
soundness come to if truth has been dethroned?  There must still be some standard against which 
individual deductions, rules, and indeed whole logical systems may be assessed.  We still want to be 
able to say that someone who infers ‘If Fred works hard, he will get a First; Fred will get a First; 
therefore Fred works hard’ has reasoned unsoundly—that he has made a logical mistake.  But in what 
does his mistake consist if not in the possibility that both premisses might be true when the conclusion 
is not true? 
It might be answered that we can still give an account of why the reasoner is making a mistake 
in terms of correct assertibility.  Our reasoner’s argument is unsound because someone could be in a 
position correctly to assert both the premisses without being in a position correctly to assert the 
conclusion.  But this just pushes the problem back: we shall then need to specify the conditions for 
correctly asserting the sentences or formulae of the relevant language.  On any view, the introduction 
of logical connectives into a language that has hitherto lacked them is going to create new grounds for 
asserting formulae.  This applies to atomic formulae as well as to molecules: once the language 
contains a conditional, for example, we can correctly assert an atomic formula B by (for example) 
deducing it from correct assertions of A and of 

If A then B

.  But given that any logical rules are going 
to generate new grounds for assertions, we have to say what it is for modus ponens to constitute an 
acceptable expansion of those grounds while affirming the consequent does not.  Moreover, the 
proponent of the present argument for Harmony has to give an account of this matter without falling 
back on the idea that a valid argument preserves truth. 
The only developed account of this that I know relies heavily on the distinction between direct 
and indirect grounds for assertion.  The thought is that, whilst logic certainly yields new indirect 
grounds for atomic assertions, its rules must be faithful to the direct grounds of formulae: we shall have 
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an instance of consequence only if any direct grounds for the premisses could be transformed into a 
direct ground for the conclusion.  This is the account of logical consequence shared by Prawitz (see 
especially his 1974) and Dummett (see especially his 1991).  Instead of direct grounds for atomic 
formulae, Prawitz writes of valid ‘closed’ arguments for them.  He duly ‘defines a sentence B as a 
logical consequence of sentences A1,…., An by the existence of an operation φ which for every choice C 
[of valid closed arguments] transforms any closed arguments for sentences A1,…., An valid relative to C 
to a closed argument for B valid relative to C’(Prawitz 1974, 74-5).  Dummett proposes essentially the 
same account.  ‘We regard [Euler’s] proof as showing us, of someone observed to cross every bridge at 
Königsberg, that he crossed at least one bridge twice, by the criteria we already possessed for crossing 
a bridge twice’ (1991, 219, emphasis in the original).  ‘If that is what deductive inference achieves’, he 
continues, ‘the requirement of harmony springs from its very nature.  When an expression, including a 
logical constant, is introduced into the language, the rules for its use should determine its meaning, but 
its introduction should not be allowed to affect the meanings of sentences already in the language’ 
(op.cit., 220).  By mastering logic we acquire new indirect grounds for making assertions.  But the 
methods we master must be faithful to the meanings of the atoms in that they preserve their conditions 
of direct assertibility. 
If consequence is to be explained in terms of the preservation of some form of correct 
assertibility, it is hard to think of any other account than the one which Prawitz and Dummett provide.  
That account, though, generates serious problems—problems which, I now argue, are so serious as to 
cast doubt upon the hypothesis that consequence can be explained in this way. 
Euler’s proof is said to show us, of someone observed to cross every bridge at Königsberg, 
that he crossed at least one bridge twice, by the criteria we already possessed for crossing a bridge 
twice.  But that cannot mean that those criteria have actually been applied to verify that our promenader 
crossed a bridge twice.  Perhaps they were so applied—perhaps an observer stationed on the 
Dombrücke, for example, saw him cross that bridge twice—but Euler’s proof would not be refuted if 
the pre-existing criteria were not actually applied.  The most that can be claimed is a counterfactual: 
had an observer been stationed on each bridge, with instructions to tick a box if, and only if, the 
promenader was observed crossing it twice, then at least one observer would have ticked his box. 
This counterfactual claim, however, is susceptible to objections parallel to those which afflict 
putative counterfactual analyses of other categorical notions.  Some philosophers used to say that an 
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object is yellow if an observer with good eyesight, viewing it in white light, would perceive it as 
yellow.  Saul Kripke objected that this account was inconsistent with something that is surely a 
metaphysical possibility—namely, the existence of killer yellow, a shade of yellow that kills any 
observer who looks at it in white light.\
8
/  In much the same way, Dummett’s account of the validity of 
Euler’s proof is inconsistent with the existence of Königsberg ennui, a strange neurological condition 
which ensures that anyone trying to observe whether a promenader has crossed a given bridge twice 
will fall into a catatonic state before any second crossing.  Like killer yellow, Königsberg ennui is 
surely a metaphysical possibility.  In a possible world where the denizens of Königsberg are afflicted 
by it, however, it will not be true that at least one of our observers would have ticked his box, had the 
promenader crossed every bridge.  Even in such a world, however, ‘The promenader crossed at least 
one bridge twice’ still follows from ‘He crossed every bridge’. 
Even if we prescind from this rather general doubt, other worries press in fast, especially when 
we turn to our second main problem and reflect on the role which the distinction between direct and 
indirect grounds needs to play in the present argument for the Harmony Thesis.  The notion of 
directness needs to be sufficiently generous, we said, that no ground for asserting a formula obtains 
unless a direct ground for asserting it could have obtained.  Yet the direct grounds for asserting a 
complex formula are constrained to be those given by the introduction rule for the formula’s main 
connective.  Combining these points, we deduce that no ground for asserting a complex formula can 
obtain unless the assertion of that formula could have been justified by applying the introduction rule 
for its main connective.  In other words, the present argument for the Harmony Thesis rests upon what 
Dummett calls the Fundamental Assumption. 
Dummett is clear that the present argument does rest upon this Assumption.  His discussion of 
the Assumption, though, does not inspire great confidence in its truth.  The Assumption is tenable, I 
think, in the case of conjunction.  If someone is entitled to assert 

A  B, then he is entitled to assert A 
and is also entitled to assert B, so his assertion of the conjunction could have been grounded in an 
application of the -introduction rule.  For none of the other familiar sentential connectives, though, is 
the Fundamental Assumption remotely plausible. 
                                                 
8
  Kripke presented this case in lectures which remain unpublished, but Lewis 1997 contains a brief 
account of it.  Kripke has long been on record as an opponent of counterfactual and dispositional 
accounts of colour; see n.71 to Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1980, 140). 
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In the case of disjunction, Dummett recognizes that the Assumption is quite untenable if we 
confine ourselves to the grounds available to an individual thinker.  While I have a ground for asserting 
‘Cheops was either the son or the stepson of Sneferu’, it is impossible for me to justify that disjunctive 
assertion by an argument which concludes with an application of the introduction rule for ‘or’.  The 
Assumption is only tenable, Dummett holds, if the grounds for making an assertion are taken to include 
those available to any of us, where ‘whatever witnesses we trust must be included among “ourselves”’ 
(1991, 266).  Thus the ancient scribe who recorded that Cheops was either the son or the stepson of 
Sneferu is one of us, and the Fundamental Assumption tells us that his assertion is correctly made only 
if he knew which it was, or if he was himself told the disjunction by someone who knew which disjunct 
obtained. 
Perhaps we can swallow this consequence of the Assumption.  Other consequences of it, 
though, are far less palatable.  Consider the assertion ‘At the moment when Brutus first stabbed Caesar 
in Pompey’s Theatre, there was either an odd or an even number of people in the Agora in Athens’.  
Let us assume that the space of the Agora has been precisely delimited, and that precise rules have been 
laid down for when a person counts as being in a space.  Given that assumption, most of would think 
ourselves entitled to make the present disjunctive assertion.  If we are so entitled, though, the 
Fundamental Assumption entails that someone—i.e., some one of us—could have been in a position 
either to assert ‘At the moment when Brutus first stabbed Caesar, an odd number of people were in the 
Agora’ or to assert ‘At that moment, an even number of people were there’. 
Dummett acknowledges, of course, that no one actually was in a position to make either of 
these claims.  ‘To interpret the fundamental assumption’, he writes, ‘we have to invoke the sense of 
“could have” which was used earlier to characterize what may be called the minimal undeniable 
concession to realism demanded by the existence of deductive inference’ (1991, 267).  In the case of 
statements about the past, he continues, this means ‘that a sufficient condition for [an assertion’s] 
correctness is that there exist effective means by which, at the relevant time, someone appropriately 
situated could have converted observations that were actually made into a verification of the statement 
asserted’ (1991, 268).  By the Fundamental Assumption, though, a closely related condition must be 
necessary: for an assertion to be correct, it is necessary that someone appropriately situated could, at 
the relevant time, have made observations which would have justified it.  In the case of either of our 
two disjuncts, though, it is hard to see how this necessary condition could be satisfied.  For where 
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would an observer be ‘appropriately situated’?  An observer in Pompey’s Theatre would have been 
well placed to notice when Brutus stabbed Caesar and to observe what was happening at that moment 
in that part of Rome; but he was not in a position to count how many people were then in the Athenian 
Agora.  An observer situated in the Agora, by contrast, may have been in a position to make a count of 
those present in the square; but he would not know when to do so.  What a direct ground for either 
disjunct needs is a pair of observers, with the first able to effect a practically instantaneous signal to tell 
the second when to make the count.  But there was no effective means of sending such a signal ‘at the 
relevant time’: the necessary technology would not be invented for several centuries.  Even if we gloss 
the Fundamental Assumption in the generous way that Dummett recommends, then, it is going to 
exclude many assertions that we take ourselves to be in a positon to make.  Its hard-line adherents may 
swallow that consequence.  The rest of us, though, will simply conclude that the Fundamental 
Assumption is false when applied to disjunctions. 
Matters are no better when we turn to (indicative) conditionals.  Dummett himself concedes 
that he cannot defend the Assumption for conditionals with disjunctive consequents (see 1991, 273) but 
in fact the problem conditionals present for it runs far deeper: the difficulty is that the standard 
introduction rule, Conditional Proof, is not a plausible codification of the circumstances in which we 
take ourselves to be entitled to assert English indicative conditionals.  If Conditional Proof were the 
operative introduction rule for the vernacular ‘if…then, a direct ground for asserting a conditional 
would be a method for transforming any possible ground for the antecedent into a ground for the 
consequent, but this principle does not get the assertibility conditions of ordinary conditionals right.  
Variants of Moore’s Paradox provide one class of counterexamples.  Consider the conjunction ‘It is 
raining but there are no grounds for asserting that it is raining’.  It is plausible to hold that there are no 
possible grounds for asserting this conjunction: any grounds for asserting the first conjunct will falsify 
the second conjunct.  Accordingly, we shall (vacuously) have a method for transforming any possible 
ground for this conjunction into a ground for asserting a self-evident absurdity, such as 0 = 1.  Given 
the principle about conditionals, it follows that there is a ground—indeed a direct ground—for 
asserting ‘If it is raining but there are no grounds for asserting that it is raining, then 0 = 1’.  But that 
conditional does not seem to be one that we shall wish to assert: in entertaining the supposition or 
hypothesis ‘It is raining but there are no grounds for asserting that it is raining’ we do not seem to be 
entertaining an absurdity but something which might well be the case. 
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The crucial point here is that in a conditional we conditionalize on the truth of the antecedent, 
not on its assertibility.  Ironically, in some of his other writings Dummett makes this point very clearly.  
‘In a sentence like “If you go into that room, you will die before nightfall”’, he remarks, ‘the event 
stated in the consequent is predicted on condition of the truth of the antecedent (construed as the future 
tense proper\
9
/), not of its justifiability’ (1990, 193).  As a point about the meaning of conditionals in 
English this is clearly correct, and Dummett goes so far as to conjecture that it is when statements 
occur as antecedents of conditionals (and in related complex constructions) that we need to draw the 
distinction between truth and justifiability (ibid.).  However that may be, the view that Conditional 
Proof specifies direct grounds for the assertion of ordinary conditionals is miles from the truth. 
One might respond to this by saying that some other rule justifies such assertions; on the view 
we are considering, it will be this other rule which specifies the sense of the conditional.  Even if it 
were possible to formulate an alternative rule, however, that would not help in the present context.  For 
(a) we do seem to be prepared to eliminate vernacular conditionals using the rule of modus ponens 
while (b) it is modus ponens which stands as the inverse of Conditional Proof (for proof, see e.g. Negri 
and von Plato 2001, 8).\
10
/  In other words, whatever exactly they are, the rules which we actually go 
by in introducing and eliminating vernacular conditionals are not in harmony. 
Severe problems also afflict the Fundamental Assumption as it applies to negated statements. 
According to the Assumption, we shall not be entitled to assert a statement in the form 

Not A

 unless 
we could have justified that assertion by applying the introduction rule for ‘not’.  According to that 
introduction rule, we may assert 

Not A

 when we have derived a contradiction from our premisses 
along with the hypothesis A.  In many circumstances where we take ourselves to be entitled to assert 

Not A

, however, it is hard to see what the appropriate premisses might be.  I look out of the window 
and see that it is not raining.  I am surely entitled to assert ‘It is not raining’, but what premisses does 
my observation deliver that would enable me to justify that assertion by applying the rule of ‘not’-
introduction?  In many circumstances of this kind, there is no plausible answer.  In looking out of the 
                                                 
9
  Dummett contrasts the ‘proper’ or ‘genuine’ future tense with ‘the future tense used to express 
present tendencies’.  ‘The latter occurs, e.g., in an announcement of the form “The wedding announced 
between A and B will not now take place”.  Such an announcement cancels, but does not falsify, the 
earlier announcement, and is not itself falsified if the couple later make it up and get married after all; 
if this were not so, the “now” would be superfluous’ (Dummett 1972, 21). 
 
10
  Vann McGee (1985) presents a case where, he thinks, we are not prepared to use modus ponens in 
drawing consequences from an indicative conditional; but see Rumfitt 2013, 176-8 and 185-6 for an 
alternative analysis of his case. 
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window, I might see that it is sunny, but being sunny is compatible with rain.  The only specification of 
the content of my experience that is guaranteed to be incompatible with ‘It is raining’ is ‘It is not 
raining’, but while I can indeed see that it is not raining, the ensuing belief that it is not raining serves 
as a premiss in my reasoning.  It is not a conclusion that has been reached by applying the rule of ‘not’-
introduction to some other premisses. 
In fact, the situation with negation is even worse than that with disjunction and the 
conditional.  In stating the introduction rule for negation, I said that 

Not A

 may be derived from some 
premisses when the combination of those premises with A yields a contradiction.  But what is a 
contradiction?  One answer might be: it is any statement in the form 

A and not A
—but we shall know 
that such a statement is contradictory only if we already know what ‘not’ means, so we cannot invoke 
this notion of a contradiction in a rule which purports to give the sense of ‘not’.  What is worse, if we 
understand the term ‘introduction rule’ in the way proposed in §1, it is demonstrable that there is no 
classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rule for ‘’.  More generally, let us follow 
Humberstone and Makinson in calling a k-place connective C contrarian if C(P1,…, Pk) is valued 
False when all of P1,…, Pk are valued True.  (Thus the falsum ‘’, conceived as a zero-place 
connective, and the unary connective ‘’are both contrarian in this sense.)  Then there is no classically 
or intuitionistically correct introduction rule for any contrarian connective.\
11
/  For let C be such a 
connective and suppose its introduction rule comprises all instances of the scheme <X1  A1,…, Xn  
An /Y  C(P1,…, Pk)>.  Since the rule is an introduction rule, it is elementary, so all the formulae in the 
premiss sequents X1  A1,…, Xn  An  and in the set Y must be sentence letters.  But then the rule 
cannot be classically correct.  Consider the substitution instance got by replacing each sentence letter 
by a classical tautology: under this substitution, each premiss sequent becomes classically valid while 
the conclusion sequent has antecedents that are all true but a false succedent.  Since every 
intuitionistically correct rule is also classically correct, there is no intuitionistically correct introduction 
rule for a contrarian connective either. 
This result may seem bizarre: we teach our logic students sequent rules for ‘’, after all.  On 
reflection, however, it is no surprise that sequent rules of the form described cannot characterize the 
logically relevant meaning of ‘’.  Such rules ensure the correctness of certain sequents—i.e., they 
                                                 
11
  This result is the first ‘Observation’ in §3 of Humberstone and Makinson 2011. 
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ensure that if certain antecedents are true, then so are certain succedents.  No collection of such rules 
can exclude the possibility that all the formulae in the language L are true, but we need to exclude that 
possibility in order to characterize ‘’, or indeed any contrarian connective.  We need to ensure, for 
example, that 

A   A is not true. 
The operative conception of an introduction rule needs to be liberalized, then, if a contrarian 
connective is to possess one.  From a formal point of view, the simplest and most common 
liberalization permits a sequent to have a null succedent.  We move, in other words, from set/formula 
sequents to set/formula-or-empty sequents.  Such a sequent is correct if and only if the formula in its 
succedent is true whenever every formula in its antecedent is true.  When the succedent is empty, i.e. 
when there is no formula in it, the sequent will be correct if and only if not every formula in its 
antecedent is true.  The sequent Q  , for example, will then be correct if and only if Q is not true.  
When the logical rules regulate set/formula-or-empty sequents, it is straightforward to give an 
introduction rule for ‘’, namely, X  {P1}  / X  P1.\
12
/  Indeed, as Makinson (2014) points 
out, in such a system we can give an introduction rule for any truth-functional connective apart from 
‘’.  We should not expect ‘’ to have an introduction rule.\13/  On the theory we are considering, such 
a rule would specify the canonical conditions for asserting ‘’; it would be surprising if there were 
conditions in which a speaker would be entitled to assert a formula which is understood always to be 
false.  For any connective C not equivalent to ‘’, however, there will be at least one structure v where 
v(C(P1,…, Pk)) is true.  Where Pj1,.., Pjm are those sentence letters evaluated as true under v and 
Pl1,.., Pln are those evaluated as false there, we have corresponding to v the rule 
                                                 
12
  In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett adopts a very different approach to the problem of 
finding an introduction rule for negation.  He works in a language with an infinite collection Q1, Q2,… 
of atomic formulae.  In our notation, his introduction rule for ‘’ is the infinitary rule whose 
underlying tuple is <P  Q1, P  Q2,…/   P > (Dummett 1991, 295).  He also proposes a 
cognate introduction rule for ‘’: < / Q1, Q2,…  > .  In the event that the atomic formulae of the 
language form a consistent set, his introduction rule for ‘’ allows A and  A both to be true.  
Similarly, his introduction rule for ‘’ allows ‘’ to be true in those circumstances.  These features are 
surely weaknesses in his theory.  Since he was not a dialetheist, an account which leaves it an open 
matter whether there can be true contradictions must be failing to characterize logically relevant 
aspects of the meaning of the negation sign.  Similarly, an account which leaves open the possibility 
that the falsum might be true is not capturing the intended sense of ‘’.  Dummett may be right to say 
that in his system ‘no logical laws could be framed that would entail’ that not every atomic sentence 
can be true (ibid.), but that is a limitation of his system.  In a system of set/formula-or-empty sequents, 
the rule < / A,  A  > entails that A and  A cannot both be true, and the infinitary rule 
< / Q1, Q2,…  > excludes the possibility that Q1, Q2,… form a consistent set. 
 
13
  It has, of course, an elimination rule: < /   >. 
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<  Pj1,..,   Pjm, Pl1 ,.., Pln   /   C(P1,…, Pk)>. 
The union of such rules for all v where v(C(P1,…, Pk)) is true is then the introduction rule for C.\
14
/ 
Natural as this liberalization is from a formal point of view, it comes at a philosophical price.  
As remarked at the outset, many adherents of the Harmony Thesis are also adherents of Inferential Role 
Semantics.  As such, they are ambitious to characterize an expression’s meaning by the rules that 
regulate its inferential use.  The move from set/formula sequents to set/formula-or-empty sequents, 
however, involves a retreat from direct engagement with the way logical expressions are used in 
inference.  A set/formula sequent represents an actual argument, in which a reasoner passes from a set 
of premisses to a conclusion.  Hence the correctness of such a sequent can be related to the intuitive 
acceptability of the corresponding inferential passage.  Where a speaker fails to reach a conclusion, 
however, we do not have an inference; we merely have a list of statements.  Accordingly, we cannot 
explain the correctness of a set/formula-or-empty sequent directly in terms of the intuitive acceptability 
of an inference.  We shall need instead to give a metalogical account of correctness, such as that in the 
previous paragraph.  This takes us further away from what, for an IRS theorist, is foundational. 
There are, to be sure, alternative ways of liberalizing the formal system which cleave more 
closely to the ideal that its rules should record the way we use connectives.  I expounded one of these 
in my essay ‘“Yes” and “No”’.\15/  The operational logical rules given there are ‘bilateral’ principles 
which regulate deductive transitions between premisses and a conclusion in each of which a yes-no 
question is followed by one of its expected answers, as in ‘Is Fred in Berlin? No. So is it the case that 
he is either in Paris or is not in Berlin? Yes’.  But even if we find a way of remaining faithful to this 
ideal, the present strategy for justifying the Harmony Thesis has reached a dead end.  Dummett 
conceded that his ‘examination of the fundamental assumption has left it very shaky’ (1991, 277), and 
with this conclusion we can only concur.  A theory of the meaning of the connectives which passes 
muster for ‘and’, but which fails for ‘or’, ‘if…then’ and ‘not’—which is committed, indeed, to 
counting these ubiquitous expressions as meaningless—is not doing well. 
                                                 
14
  We may liberalize introduction and elimination rules to those governing set/formula-or-empty 
sequents while retaining the requirement that such rules must be elementary.  If we do this, we shall 
exclude the introduction and elimination rules that Stephen Read proposes for his paradoxical zero-
place connective ‘bullet’, a proof-conditional Liar sentence (Read 2000, 140-42).  Those who regard 
the bullet as meaningless will wish to retain the requirement of elementariness. 
 
15
  Rumfitt 2000.  When I wrote that paper, I still thought there might be something in the Harmony 
Thesis, so I was concerned to show how the operational rules of my system conformed to an analogue 
of the harmony requirement.  I no longer see any grounds for requiring such conformity. 
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One might wonder how Dummett felt entitled to pursue his project of justifying the laws of 
intuitionistic logic, while de-legitimating classical logic on the ground of its alleged violations of the 
Harmony Thesis, when he admitted that the grounds for the Thesis were so shaky.  His reason is 
interesting.  The laws of intuitionistic logic, he says, ‘are not going to be called into question by any 
uncertainties over the scope or status of the fundamental assumption, precisely because the classical 
logician will admit that assumption, interpreted in terms of an ideal observer’ (1991, 279).  His thought 
is this.  At this point in the dialectic, we shall have been so completely persuaded—perhaps by 
Dummett’s own ‘manifestation argument’, or his argument about the acquisition of language—that 
truth needs to be dethroned from its place in the traditional explanation of consequence, that we shall 
accept the Prawitz-Dummett account of that notion in terms of preservation of direct grounds.  It is 
simply that those people willing to assert (for example) the disjunction ‘At the moment when Brutus 
first stabbed Caesar, there was either an odd or an even number of people in the Agora’ will do so 
because they are prepared to postulate a God-like ideal observer who was able to make a count of the 
people in the Agora in Athens at the very moment when the knife went in in Rome.  The upshot of our 
discussion, however, is that this is quite the wrong moral to draw.  There is no space to rehearse 
Dummett’s arguments against the intelligibility of a notion of truth that goes beyond the existence of a 
verification.  To put the point at its mildest, though, those arguments are far from conclusive, and our 
analysis suggests that a real strike against their conclusion is the immense difficulty we shall then face 
in trying to forge a notion of consequence to replace the familiar one cast in terms of truth-
preservation. 
More precisely, what we have seen are some of the difficulties in forging an alternative 
account of consequence that will sustain the Harmony Thesis.  At every turn, the traditional account in 
terms of preservation of truth cries out to be restored.  Of course, there is no suggestion that 
resurrecting the traditional account is going to open any direct path towards justifying classical logic: 
for one thing, one can adopt the traditional account of consequence without postulating the Principle of 
Bivalence.  But the arguments we have so far considered for imposing a harmony requirement, and for 
deviating from classical logic because it violates that requirement, lead only into a morass.  If this is the 
best that can be said in favour of the Harmony Thesis, the classical logician has nothing to fear from it. 
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4. Arguments from the ‘innocence’ of logic 
 
The argument for the Harmony Thesis just analysed assumes that the introduction rule for a connective 
specifies its meaning.  That assumption is in any case far from compelling.  It is more plausible to take 
ordinary competence with the indicative conditional, for example, to be manifest in applications of its 
elimination rule—modus ponens—than in mastery of whatever rule regulates its introduction.\16/  The 
arguments for Harmony that I consider next do not assume any semantic priority for the introduction 
rules.  Indeed, they do not assume that any one sort of rule—whether it be the introduction rules or the 
elimination rules—will by itself specify the meanings of the connectives.\17/ 
The first such argument rests on a premiss about the nature of logic.  Dummett sometimes 
writes as though the Inversion Principle follows from a general requirement of harmony that applies 
between the grounds and consequences of any meaningful statement.  Florian Steinberger, per contra, 
argues as follows: 
 
Whatever misgivings one may have about Dummett’s wider project, a strong case can be 
made for a logic-specific harmony requirement.  The reason for this stems from the role logic 
plays in our assertoric practices.  On the use-theoretic view [of meaning], the meanings of 
non-logical sentences (sentences not containing any logical operators) are thought to be given 
                                                 
16
  See again n.10 above on purported counterexamples to modus ponens. 
 
17
  Recognizing the difficulties confronting his Fundamental Assumption, Dummett briefly canvassed 
an alternative theory whereby every connective’s meaning is given by its elimination rule.  On this 
view, justifying the Harmony Thesis ‘will depend upon an inverse fundamental assumption, namely, 
that any consequence of a given statement can be derived by means of an argument beginning with an 
application of one of the elimination rules governing the principal operator of that statement, in which 
the statement figures as the major premiss.  This assumption is open to fewer intuitive objections than 
the fundamental assumption on which our original justification procedure rested.  It is more plausible 
that we derive simpler consequences from complex statements only when those consequences follow 
logically than that we assert such statements only when they follow logically from simpler statements 
we have previously accepted’ (Dummett 1991, 281). 
     Dummett’s account of this alternative ‘pragmatist’ theory is sketchy, although Prawitz (2007), 
Queiroz (2008), and Litland (forthcoming) have developed it further.  In particular, Litland (op. cit., 
§4) corrects various mistakes in Dummett’s sketch, and shows that a cleaned up Inverse Assumption 
justifies precisely the intuitionistic introduction rules for the connectives, given the intuitionistic 
elimination rules for them.  It is good to know where this approach leads.  In later writings, however, 
Dummett came to doubt if the sort of pragmatist theory of meaning that the Inverse Fundamental 
Assumption requires could be coherently elaborated (see especially Dummett 2007).  In Rumfitt 2016, 
I identify a number of foundational problems that pragmatist theories of meaning must face, and 
criticize extant attempts to solve them. 
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by their I- and E-principles.\
18
/  Logic, in addition to the direct grounds for assertion given by 
the appropriate I-principles, offers indirect grounds for asserting non-logical sentences: we 
may assert a non-logical sentence if it can be correctly deduced from a set of accepted 
premisses.  But for these indirect deductive routes to assertibility to be not only legitimate but 
to have the unassailable reliability we require of logical inference, our logical modes of 
inference must respect the conditions under which the (direct) assertion of non-logical 
sentences is justified.  That is, logical inference alone may not license the assertion of non-
logical sentences that we should not have been in a position to assert directly (at least in 
principle).  Let us call this the principle of innocence: it should not be possible, solely by 
engaging in deductive logical reasoning, to discover hitherto unknown (atomic) truths that we 
would have been incapable of discovering independently of logic….How can we make sure 
that innocence obtains?  This is where harmony comes in.  The primary purpose of harmony is 
to secure the innocence of logic (Steinberger 2011, 619-20). 
 
Steinberger further contends that harmony is the best way—perhaps the only way—of securing 
innocence: 
 
A moment’s reflection reveals not only that harmony is an adequate measure, but that it seems 
entirely natural that any measure designed to guarantee the holding of the requirement of 
innocence should take the form of a harmony requirement.  After all, our aim is to ensure that 
the meanings of the logical constants are fixed in such a way as not to perturb the non-logical 
regions of language.  The best way to do this (at a local level) is by requiring that the 
introduction and elimination rules that govern the meanings of logical constants be exactly 
commensurate in strength.  Why?  Well, because when such an equilibrium between I-rules 
and E-rules obtains, we can rest assured that our deductive practices will not, as it were, create 
novel grounds for asserting non-logical sentences (as in the case, for example, of [Prior’s 
invented connective] tonk).  The requirement of harmony thus seems to be an eminently 
reasonable and natural safeguard for the principle of innocence (op. cit., 620). 
                                                 
18
  In Steinberger’s terminology, the ‘I-principles’ pertaining to a sentence A state the conditions in 
which a speaker of the relevant language is entitled to assert A.  The corresponding ‘E-principles’ state 
what a speaker who asserts A is thereby entitled to do.  See op. cit., 618. 
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Steinberger spells out as follows the equilibrium he has in mind: ‘nothing more and nothing less may 
be deduced from an assertion of A$B via $-E than can already be deduced from the premisses of the 
corresponding I-rules.  Put another way,…the E-rules ought to exploit all and only the inferential 
powers that the I-rules have bestowed upon it’ (ibid.).  His requirement of equilibrium, then, demands 
the satisfaction of Negri and von Plato’s Inversion Principle, and something more besides.  As we saw 
in §1, their Inversion Principle is satisfied when the standard introduction rule for ‘’ is paired with its 
quantum-logical elimination rule, but Steinberger insists that that elimination rule fails to exploit all the 
inferential power bestowed by the introduction rule (see his discussion of ‘E-weak disharmony’, op. 
cit., 621).  If it works, then, Steinberger’s argument justifies a form of the Harmony Thesis that is even 
more exacting (as far as the logical connectives are concerned) than that proposed by Prawitz and 
Dummett. 
Does his argument work, though?  There are strong reasons to doubt it. 
First, the principle of innocence is far less compelling than Steinberger supposes.  Since Mill’s 
A System of Logic, with its notorious claim that ‘nothing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism 
which was not known, or assumed to be known, before’ (Mill 1891, II iii 1), a central problem in the 
philosophy of logic has been to reconcile the conclusiveness of correct deduction with its ability to 
expand our knowledge.  Part of the explanation of how deduction generates new knowledge is that 
premisses founded on different sources of knowledge can entail a conclusion that no source founds by  
itself.  A trusty informant tells me that John is either in the common room or the library; I see that he is 
not in the common room; I deduce that he is in the library.  I know the first premiss through testimony 
and I know the second as result of observation.  But whilst I come to know the conclusion, my 
knowledge of it does not stem from either testimony or observation alone: I was not told that John is in 
the library, nor did I see him there.  Of course, this case is not itself a counterexample to Steinberger’s 
principle of innocence.  Although I did not in fact see John in the library, in principle I could have 
done.  In our ordinary deductive practice, however, we are fully prepared to splice together different 
sources of knowledge to deduce conclusions that could not be founded on any ‘direct’ evidence, even 
in principle.  Suppose I know—through astronomical theory, and appropriate observations—that a 
body B is either in region R of the Andromeda Galaxy or is in a black hole.  Suppose I make some 
further observations, and come to know that B is not in region R.  I may then deduce that B is in a black 
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hole.  It is (we may assume) impossible even in principle to discover by direct observation whether a 
body is in a black hole.  For all that, this second deduction appears to be just as cogent as the first.  In 
each case, the deduction yields knowledge of its conclusion, even though in the second case that 
knowledge could not have been attained directly, even in principle.  Contra Steinberger’s principle of 
innocence, then, by engaging in deduction we can discover hitherto unknown atomic truths that we 
would have been incapable of discovering without logic.  The principle of innocence is far from 
innocent.  Were it accepted, it would seriously restrict the use we actually of make of deductive logic in 
enlarging our knowledge. 
Second, even if we grant the principle, it may be secured by a weaker requirement than that of 
equilibrium between introduction and elimination rules.   As Steinberger acknowledges, innocence will 
be secured if the non-logical regions of language are unperturbed by the logical rules—i.e., if those 
rules create no novel grounds for asserting non-logical sentences.  This condition will be met if the 
logical rules en bloc create no such novel grounds—a ‘global’ condition in his terms.  To ensure 
innocence, then, we need not descend to the ‘local’ level and require the introduction and elimination 
rules of each individual connective to be in equilibrium. 
There is, in fact, a natural way of making the global condition more precise.  The direct 
grounds for asserting non-logical formulae will induce a consequence relation R

 on the language L

 
that
 
comprises only such formulae.  Innocence will be secured if the expanded consequence relation R 
that is induced on the full language L when the logical rules are added is a conservative extension of R

.  
That is, R as restricted to L

 does not extend R

.   Steinberger is well aware that this global condition 
may be satisfied even when the introduction and elimination rules of a certain connective are not in 
equilibrium (op cit., 625 and 634-8).  The problem is that his principle of innocence only sustains the 
global condition.  The conservative extension requirement is enough to ensure that the ‘meanings’ of 
atomic formulae—or better: the consequential relations between them—are left unperturbed.  It also 
excludes Prior’s rogue connective ‘tonk’, whose introduction rule is <P1/ P1 tonk P2> and whose 
elimination rule is <P1 tonk P2/ P2> (Prior 1960).  ‘Tonk’ is indeed a runabout inference ticket, which 
licenses the move from one formula to any other, so its rules will violate conservativeness unless the 
pre-logical consequence relation R

 is already total (see Belnap 1962). 
Robert Brandom’s conception of logic in similar to Steinberger’s, but he is more circumspect 
about its implications for harmony (Brandom 1994, 2000).  On Brandom’s view, what characterizes the 
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logical notions is their role in ‘making explicit’ the relations between non-logical sentences that are 
traced out in material inferences and in recognitions of incompatibility.  A good material inference 
takes a thinker from ‘Edinburgh is north of London’ to ‘London is south of Edinburgh’; we may 
express our acceptance of that inference by asserting the conditional ‘If Edinburgh is north of London, 
then London is south of Edinburgh’.  Similarly, we express our recognition of the incompatibility 
between the table’s being red all over and its being green all over by saying ‘If the table is red all over, 
then it is not green all over’.  What Brandom takes to follow from this doctrine is, simply, the 
conservative extension requirement: 
 
Unless the introduction and elimination rules are inferentially conservative, the introduction of 
the new vocabulary licenses new material inferences, and so alters the contents associated 
with the old vocabulary.  So if logical vocabulary is to play its distinctive expressive role of 
making explicit the original material inferences, and so conceptual contents expressed by the 
old vocabulary, it must be a criterion of adequacy for introducing logical vocabulary that no 
new inferences involving the old vocabulary be made appropriate thereby (Brandom 2000, 
68-9; see Brandom 1994 123-30 for a fuller exposition of the same argument). 
 
Brandom is right, I think, to claim that his expressivist account of logic demands the conservative 
extension requirement.  The important point for present purposes, however, is that it only demands that: 
conservative extension may be satisfied even if the rules for the connectives do not satisfy the Principle 
of Inversion, i.e., even if the Harmony Thesis is false.\
19
/ 
This comes out clearly, indeed, in the case of the classical propositional calculus.  As noted 
earlier, the introduction rule for negation is Simple Reductio: X  {P1}  / X  P1.  The 
elimination rule which is in harmony with this is Ex Contradictio Quodlibet: {P1, P1} P2.  While 
these two rules together characterize the intuitionistic logic of negation, its classical logic demands a 
further principle.  There are many additional principles which will do.  For definiteness, let us add the 
rule form of Excluded Middle, EM:  X  {A} B, Y  {A} B / X  Y  B.  (Adding assumptions 
to a sequent is often called ‘thinning’, so Harold Hodes aptly calls EM a ‘thickening’ rule: it allows the 
                                                 
19
  Peregrin (2008) argues that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that makes inferences explicit.  
He reaches this conclusion, however, by importing a number of contentious assumptions into the 
explanation of what it is to make an inference explicit. 
 26 
deduction of a sequent from other sequents with the same succedent whose antecedents include 
formulae which do not appear in the antecedent of the conclusion (Hodes 2004, 148)).  In the resulting 
system, the Harmony Thesis is violated: the logical behaviour of ‘’ is not regulated only by a pair of 
harmonious introduction and elimination rules.  But the classical consequence relation conservatively 
extends whatever pre-logical consequence relation obtains among the non-logical formulae: where 
P1, …, Pn and Q are atoms, there is a classically admissible truth-value assignment which assigns True 
to all of P1, …, Pn and False to Q, so if Q is a consequence of P1, …, Pn, that must be because the pre-
logical consequence relation determines it as such.\
20
/ 
 
 
5. Tennant’s argument for harmony 
 
Neil Tennant is an adherent of the Harmony Thesis who distinguishes sharply between harmony proper 
and the conservative extension requirement.\
21
/  He also holds that the introduction rule and elimination 
rule for a connective jointly determine its sense, so that the Thesis cannot be justified by requiring the 
rules of one sort to keep faith with the meanings already laid down by rules of the other sort.\
22
/  
Rather, he holds, its justification arises from a requirement of coherence between the introduction and 
elimination rules for a given connective.  As Prior’s ‘tonk’ shows, not every pair of introduction and 
elimination rules succeeds in endowing the connective it purports to characterize with a sense.  It is by 
spelling out the requirements for coherence that Tennant aims to justify the Thesis.\
23
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20
  If the introduction and elimination rules of a new connective are in harmony, will the resulting 
system conservatively extend the pre-existing consequence relation?  Prawitz (1994, 374) argued not: 
the natural introduction and elimination rules for the truth-predicate are in harmony, but the result of 
adding a truth-predicate to Peano Arithmetic is not a conservative extension of it.  See, however, Hodes 
(2004, 148-50) and Steinberger (2011, 635-7) for reasons to doubt whether the scope of introduction 
and elimination rules should be extended to encompass predicates as well as operators. 
 
21
  See especially chapter 10 of Tennant 1987, which patiently untangles passages in Dummett’s early 
writings on the topic (1975a, 1975b) that mix up the two requirements. 
 
22
  At least, he does in his book Anti-Realism and Logic (Tennant, 1987).  In The Taming of the True, 
he holds that the introduction rules give the meanings of the connectives as they are used in a priori 
science whereas the elimination rules give their meanings as they appear in empirical discourse.  
Harmony is then needed to ensure that there is no equivocation between the two sorts of occurrence 
(Tennant 1997, 23).  Unfortunately, I lack the space to analyse this argument here. 
 
23
  See especially p.94: ‘There is another kind of equilibrium, which would be of interest even to one 
who refuses to acknowledge the asymmetric division of rules into those that are constitutive and those 
that are merely explicative of meaning.  This way is to regard the rules of introduction and elimination 
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The precise form of harmony that Tennant defends is subtly different from that in Negri and 
von Plato.  To state it accurately we need some terminology.  Let us say that a formula is a maximally 
strong F if it is F and entails any formula that is F; and let us say that a formula is a maximally weak F 
if it is F and is entailed by any formula that is F.  Tennant’s First Principle of Harmony may then be 
stated as follows.  A formula whose main connective is C is to be 
 
(a) a maximally strong statement that can stand as conclusion of the introduction rule for C, 
given the elimination rule for C; and 
(b) a maximally weak statement that can stand as major premiss of the elimination rule for C, 
given the introduction rule for C. 
 
We may illustrate this First Principle with the case of ‘’.  To show part (a) for this connective, let X be 
any formula that can stand as the conclusion of -introduction, with A and B as premisses.  We then 
have that A entails X and B entails X.  By -elimination, it follows that A  B entails X, showing that 

A  B is a maximally strong statement that can stand as conclusion of -introduction.  To show part 
(b), let Y be any formula that can stand as the major premiss of -elimination. Then, whenever A entails 
C and B entails C, Y entails C.  By -introduction, A entails A  B, as does B, so Y entails A  B.  
Thus 

A  B is a maximally weak statement that can stand as major premiss of -elimination. 
As this demonstration shows, Tennant’s First Principle is satisfied whether the -elimination 
rule has its usual form, in which the use of side premises is permitted, or takes the restricted form it has 
in quantum logic, in which C may be inferred from 

A  B only if it follows from A alone and from B 
alone.  The First Principle, then, fails to distinguish between the two forms of the rule.  For this reason, 
Tennant also lays down a Second Principle.  When a pair of introduction and elimination rules CI and 
CE for a connective C meets conditions (a) and (b), let us say that the pair is in harmony (with a small 
‘h’).  We further say that the pair is in Harmony (with a capital ‘H’) if CE is the strongest elimination 
rule with which CI is in harmony and CI is the strongest introduction rule with which CE is in 
harmony.  Tennant’s Second Principle requires the rules for a meaningful connective to be in Harmony.  
The form of -elimination which permits side premises is stronger than the form which does not: it 
                                                                                                                                            
as equally involved in specifying or constituting meaning, but to demand harmony as a conditio sine 
qua non of their doing so.  The thought would be that not just any set of rules will do in order to confer 
determinate meaning on a logical operator’. 
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allows us to derive more conclusions from a given disjunction.  It is the unrestricted form of the 
elimination rule, then, which is in Harmony with the rule of -introduction, so the restricted form falls 
foul of Tennant’s Second Principle.  It is good to have a criterion which improves on Negri and von 
Plato’s Inversion Principle in excluding the restricted form of -elimination.  We shall, however, need 
a justification for requiring rules to be in Harmony as well as harmony. 
Tennant contends that satisfaction of both his Principles of Harmony is ‘a conditio sine qua 
non of’ rules specifying or constituting a coherent meaning for the connective in question (1987, 94).  
He further claims that this condition has revisionary implications for logic.  ‘The correct consequence 
relation, insofar as it should arise solely from the meanings of the logical constants, is, naturally, the 
least relation with respect to which the Harmony of the rules governing those constants can be 
sustained’ (op.cit., 97).  The least such relation, Tennant thinks, is that characterized by the system he 
calls intuitionistic relevant logic.  ‘I intend thereby to reveal as unjustifiable excrescences the extra 
ingredients in the consequence relation of classical logic that have earned the generic labels (a) the 
fallacies of relevance, and (b) the classical laws of negation’ (ibid.).  We need, then, to consider the 
arguments Tennant advances for two theses.  The first thesis is his claim that satisfaction of the two 
Principles of Harmony is a necessary condition for a connective to possess a coherent meaning.  The 
second is the claim that any logical principles that go beyond a Harmonious pair of introduction and 
elimination rules are ‘unjustifiable excrescences’.  I shall contend that neither of these theses is well 
supported.\
24
/ 
How does Tennant argue for the first thesis?  The precise course of his reasoning is somewhat 
hard to follow, but we are told that ‘the requirement for harmony emerges clearly if one follows a 
philosophical method that has the appearance of empirical speculation about the origins of language, 
but is actually designed to focus on constitutive features of meaning.  This is the method of enquiring 
after the aetiology of entrenchment of expressions in a language and of conventions governing their 
use’ (1987, 77).  The general idea is that we shall be unable to explain how the logical connectives 
could have become entrenched in a language—that is to say, how they could have acquired a stable 
meaning—unless their introduction and elimination rules are in Harmony.  The claim that Harmony is 
                                                 
24
  It is Tennant’s second thesis that justifies his claim that the correct laws of logic are confined to the 
rules of intuitionistic relevant logic.  This logic yields the least consequence relation that satisfies his 
two Principles of Harmony.  Litland (op. cit. Part II) shows in effect full intuitionistic logic is the 
strongest logic that satisfies the two Principles. 
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a conditio sine qua non for such rules to constitute or specify a connective’s meaning duly comes at the 
end of a long passage describing how meanings for the connectives might have become entrenched. 
What is Tennant’s account of entrenchment?  It certainly has the appearance of empirical 
speculation about the origins of language.  We are asked to imagine a community of speakers who start 
off using only atomic statements; Tennant then asks how connectives could be added—one at a time—
to their dialect.  He suggests that we would be unable to understand how this could happen unless the 
rules governing those connectives satisfy his two Principles of Harmony. 
This account exemplifies a genre which one might call the Just So Story.  We find it hard to 
imagine how a meaningful connective could have been added to a language unless certain conditions 
are met.  So we take those conditions to be necessary for the connectives to have a meaning.  Of 
course, my name for the genre carries a warning.  Kipling’s account of how the elephant got its trunk 
does have a certain explanatory charm.  Few people today, though, would regard it as even a remote 
approximation to the truth.  So if we are, O Best Beloved, to venture forth to the philosophical tributary 
of the great grey-green, greasy Limpopo River, all set about with normalized proof trees, we shall need 
to take care.  We shall need to make sure that if a condition is imposed on the connectives, the 
condition really is necessary for them to have a meaning and does not simply express a philosopher’s 
preconceptions about how language ought to work.  If we read Tennant’s account with that warning in 
mind, we shall find his story even less persuasive than Kipling’s. 
The root of the problem is that Tennant’s account of how the connectives get entrenched does 
not explain how they come to have their actual meanings.  The difficulty comes out clearly in the case 
of negation—a case which is of course central to the choice between classical and intuitionistic logic.  
Our signs for negation, Tennant hypothesizes, originate in the need one speaker may have to contradict 
or challenge an atomic assertion by another: ‘dialogue, not monologue is where negation first 
flourishes’ (1987, 83).  Let us accept this for the sake of argument.  ‘The challenger’, he goes on, ‘must 
have information to the contrary, rather than be merely playing the role of the uninformed doubter’ (op. 
cit., 84).  Let us accept this too.  Tennant further contends that a speaker who challenges A by saying 

Not A

 is ‘saying something about the same subject matter’ as A (ibid., emphasis in the original).  If a 
speaker who says 

Not A

 were merely doubting ‘the existence of a warrant for [A], then the challenge 
would be self-warranting, for nothing could serve as better evidence for such a claim than its own 
making’ (ibid.).  Again, this seems right.  Tennant infers from this that the sort of challenge to A that is 
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expressed by 

Not A

 ‘must be conceived of as possessing warrants that are as open to independent 
public assessment as are the warrants of the assertions challenged’ (ibid.).  We may accept this too.  
‘Denial of A,’ he concludes, ‘has the force “I have good reason to believe that there is no warrant for 
A” rather than the weaker “I have no reason to believe (apart from your asserting it) that you have any 
warrant for A”.  Denial… carries with it no in-built guarantee of excluded middle’ (op. cit., 85). 
That final conclusion, though, does not follow from the considerations that are adduced to 
support it, and in any case it seriously misrepresents the way ordinary speakers actually use signs for 
negation.  Of course Tennant is right to claim that someone who says 

Not A

 is saying more than ‘I 
have no reason to believe that you have any warrant for A’.  As Heyting pointed out long ago, if this 
were the right account of the meaning of ‘not’, then someone who said ‘Not every even number greater 
than two is the sum of two primes’ would be making an autobiographical statement, not a mathematical 
one.  But Tennant’s account equally misrepresents the content of that negated claim.  On his view, 
someone who makes the claim is saying ‘I have good reason to believe that there is no warrant for the 
claim that every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes’.  Now in certain 
circumstances that might be a perfectly sensible thing to say, and if one understands negation in this 
way, then the law of excluded middle will indeed fail to be valid.  It is not, however, the way most of 
us understand negation.  On Tennant’s account, it would be correct to say ‘Not every even number 
greater than two is the sum of two primes’ if the Goldbach Conjecture were unprovable.  For most of 
us, though, it would be correct to say as much only if the Conjecture were false—i.e., only if some 
even number greater than two were not the sum of two primes. 
It may be replied that to object in this way is to fail to take seriously the possibility that 
classical logic might need to be revised.  Not so: the objection is simply to Tennant’s argument for 
revising it.  It is, we are told, impossible to understand how the use of ‘not’ could have become 
entrenched unless it originated in the way Tennant describes.  But the story he tells fails to explain the 
patterns of use which have actually become entrenched.  In this respect, his Just So Story is less 
persuasive than Kipling’s, for Kipling was at least offering an explanation for something that is 
actually the case.  Elephants, after all, do have trunks. 
So much for Tennant’s first thesis.  What about his claim that any logical principles that go 
beyond a Harmonious pair of introduction and elimination rules are ‘unjustifiable excrescences’?  As 
far as I can discern, the only argument he gives for this second thesis is in a parenthesis: ‘The correct 
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consequence relation, insofar as it should arise solely from the meanings of the logical constants, is, 
naturally, the least relation with respect to which the Harmony of the rules governing those constants 
can be sustained’ (op. cit., 97).  That ‘insofar as’ clause is doing all the work.  Tennant seems to take it 
to be obvious that the logical laws regulating a connective will arise solely from its meaning, but he 
gives no argument for this claim, which is in truth very far from obvious.  Certainly, it is not obvious 
that only introduction and elimination rules may regulate a connective’s logical behaviour.  A classical 
logician might hold the position sketched at the end of §4, whereby the introduction and elimination 
rules for negation are the intuitionistic ones—namely, the rules of Simple Reductio and Ex 
Contradictione Quodlibet—but where an additional rule concerning negation—the thickening rule 
EM—is nevertheless valid.\25/  There is no question of trying to justify EM by way of harmony 
considerations: it has the form neither of an introduction rule nor of an elimination rule.  However, in 
the absence of any argument for the claim that the only valid principles that concern a connective are a 
Harmonious pair of such rules, there is no basis for Tennant’s claim that EM is an ‘unjustifiable 
excrescence’. 
Tennant may protest that the case of ‘tonk’ shows that there must be some constraints on the 
introduction and elimination rules for a meaningful connective.  Many people believe that those 
constraints amount to Harmony.  Adding extra logical rules for a connective threatens to destabilise the 
equilibrium that Harmony guarantees, and thereby deprive the connective in question of a coherent 
sense.  But there is a far better explanation of why ‘tonk’ is meaningless than that it violates Harmony.  
It is not meaningful, because a formula whose main connective it is does not say anything; such a 
formula does not say anything because it does not have truth-conditions.  Thus consider the formula ‘2 
is prime tonk 4 is prime’.  This formula follows by ‘tonk’-introduction from ‘2 is prime’, which is true, 
                                                 
25
  This is, indeed, Hodes’s position in his 2004.  He holds that only introduction and elimination rules 
can constitute the sense of a connective (147), and requires that the elimination rule should be the 
maximum inverter of the introduction rule and that the introduction rule should be the maximum 
invertee of the elimination rule (156).  (This amounts to Tennant’s requirement of Harmony.)  Hodes 
defines the ‘basic logic’ of a language to be that comprising only the sense-constituting rules for the 
connectives (151).  Given his requirement of Harmony, he takes the basic logic for English to be first-
order intuitionistic logic (ibid.).  However, he allows that other sorts of rule, including EM, are fully 
justified (154), so that the ‘total logic’ for ordinary mathematical English is classical. 
      Hodes advances no argument for the Harmony requirement: he simply presents it as a conjecture 
whose implications are worth tracing out.  Given that he allows the legitimacy of EM, though, his 
acceptance of the Harmony Thesis is in any case somewhat half-hearted.  On his view, EM is a 
legitimate part of our inferential practice with negation.  From an IRS perspective, then, it is part of the 
meaning of ‘not’.  I do not see the point of saying that, because EM is neither an introduction nor an 
elimination rule, it is not part of the sense of that word. 
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so it must be itself true.  Yet ‘4 is prime’, which is not true, follows by ‘tonk’-elimination from it, so 
the formula cannot be true.  No coherent truth-condition can be assigned, then, to ‘2 is prime tonk 4 is 
prime’, and since both components do have truth-conditions, the culprit is clearly ‘tonk’.  As an 
explanation of why ‘tonk’ is meaningless, this explanation is superior to Belnap’s, according to which 
‘tonk’ is defective because it non-conservatively extends the pre-existing consequence relation.  We 
shall sometimes want to do that, as when we add a truth-predicate to a mathematical theory (see n.20 
above), but we shall never want a declarative formula to lack truth-conditions.  If a formula succeeds in 
saying something, it will have a truth-condition, viz., the condition that is satisfied if, and only if, 
things are as the formula says they are.  So the only declarative formulae that lack truth-conditions are 
those that fail to say anything.\
26
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6. Harmony and Inferential Role Semantics 
 
Our examination of three prominent arguments for the Harmony Thesis has left it without any 
justification.  Supposing it is false, does that threaten Inferential Role Semantics?  I think not.  Our 
discussion of the Dummett-Prawitz argument for Harmony revealed the huge difficulties that confront 
the project of trying to explicate the notions of consequence and validity directly in terms of the rules 
which, for the IRS theorist, constitute the meanings of the connectives.  But the IRS theorist is free to 
take an indirect approach.  He might take the rules that characterize a connective’s inferential role as 
specifying its sense, but allow that it also has a reference, or a semantic value.  This semantic value will 
be the contribution the connective makes to the truth-conditions of a formula in which it occurs.  Once 
we have a specification of truth-conditions for formulae of the relevant language, we can apply the 
traditional account of consequence in terms of the preservation (or necessary preservation) of truth.\
27
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  This account of what is wrong with ‘tonk’ is essentially that proposed by J.T. Stevenson in his reply 
to Prior (Stevenson 1961).  Stevenson’s reply was rather eclipsed by Belnap’s, which appeared the 
following year and started the harmony hare running.  Brilliant as Belnap’s paper is, I think it was 
Stevenson who gave the better explanation of why ‘tonk’ fails to have a sense. 
 
27
  In the Dewey Lectures which he delivered at Columbia University in 2002 (published as Dummett 
2006), Dummett retreated to this position.  ‘The proponent of a truth-conditional theory of meaning’, 
he wrote, ‘must argue that [the] use [of sentences] cannot be described without appeal to the conditions 
for the truth of statements…To an important degree, such an argument would be correct’ (Dummett 
2006, 29).  Truth is ‘indispensable’ in describing how sentences are used because ‘a salient part of 
using a language is to give arguments in support of some conclusion’, so that a full description of their 
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This oblique approach plainly requires an account of how the inferential roles determine 
semantic values—in Fregean terms, how sense determines reference.  That is, it requires what 
Christopher Peacocke calls a ‘determination theory’.  In his paper ‘Understanding Logical Constants: A 
Realist’s Account’ (1987), Peacocke begins to develop such a theory for the connectives, and Hodes 
(2004) has pursued the matter further.  The best hope of an IRS theory of meaning lies, I think, with 
this approach, and the determination theory goes more smoothly if the inferential roles played by the 
connectives are characterized by the ‘bilateral’ rules mentioned at n.15 above, rather than the more 
familiar ‘unilateral’ rules.  The kernel of any determination theory for the connectives will be the 
principle that the rules the reasoner goes by (or ought to go by) must preserve the correctness of 
sequents.  For unilateral sequents, correctness is in turn a matter of preserving truth.  Even given 
Bivalence, however, this constraint on the classical sequent rules fails to ensure that 

Not A

 is true 
whenever A is false (see Peacocke 1987, 164 and Hodes 2004, 162).  By contrast, that fact about the 
semantic value of ‘not’ may be ‘read off’ the intuitive correctness of the bilateral sequent rule 
exemplified by ‘Is Fred at home? No. So is it the case that Fred is not at home? Yes’. 
Whether a fully satisfactory determination theory can be given for the connectives is an open 
question—one of the most interesting and pressing in the philosophy of logic and language.  The 
verdict on the immediate issue, though, is clear.  Some people like Górecki’s Third Symphony but few 
would say that it is a patch on Beethoven’s.  One reason is that Beethoven knew better when to leaven 
harmony with dissonance.  As in music, so in logic: there is no universal requirement of harmony. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
use ‘needs a notion of truth, as that which is guaranteed to be transmitted from premisses to conclusion 
of a deductively valid argument’ (op.cit., 29, 31, 32). 
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